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SCHOOL BOARD CONTROL OVER EDUCATION AND 
A TEACHER’S RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
RALPH D. MAWDSLEY, J.D., Ph.D.* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Privacy in its broadest meaning is the protection of an individual’s interest 
in making decisions free of government interference.1  The Supreme Court has 
recognized that the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment2 protects “a 
right of personal privacy”3 that includes “the interest in independence in 
making certain kinds of important decisions.”4  However, the right to make 
decisions without government interference is not without limits.  For public 
school teachers, their expectation of privacy is diminished by the reality that 
they have been employed to instruct students, most of whom are minors 
required under state compulsory attendance laws to attend school. 
School boards entrust teachers with the responsibility to provide students 
with the knowledge and skills that comport with board policy.  When teachers 
instruct students, board members expect that teachers will adhere to approved 
guidelines and conduct themselves in school settings in an appropriate and 
professional manner.  When teachers deviate from these guidelines or act in a 
manner that board members and school officials consider not to be in the best 
interests of the school district, disciplinary action may result. 
Privacy issues for teachers can arise in four areas: first, personal privacy, 
essentially freedom to make lifestyle choices; second, physical privacy, 
essentially freedom from search and seizure; third, instructional privacy, 
 
* Ralph D. Mawdsley is Professor, College of Education and Human Services, Cleveland State 
University.  He holds a J.D. from the University of Illinois and a Ph.D. from the University of 
Minnesota.  Dr. Mawdsley teaches School Law, Sports Law, and Special Education Law to 
graduate and law students.  In addition to having over 300 publications, including fifteen books, 
to his credit, he speaks regularly at education law conferences in the United States, Europe, South 
Africa, and Australia. 
 1. See, e.g., Littlejohn v. Rose, 768 F.2d 765 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1045 
(1985) (non-tenured teacher’s privacy right might have been violated if school board’s non-
renewal decision was based on her divorce). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[No] State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.”). 
 3. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
 4. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). 
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essentially freedom to provide appropriate knowledge and skills in the 
educational setting; and fourth, associational privacy, essentially freedom to 
establish relationships with students and others in settings related or unrelated 
to the workplace. 
Privacy as a protected right for employees in the United States is grounded 
in several constitutional provisions.5  Most generally, the notion of privacy is 
associated with confidentiality of information, which is protected under both 
the Liberty Clause of the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment6 and the 
Fourth Amendment’s protection from unreasonable searches and seizures.7  
However, an expanded understanding of privacy can find protection under the 
concepts of the right of association protected under the Liberty Clause and the 
First Amendment,8 expression of ideas under the Free Speech Clause of the 
First Amendment,9 and practice of one’s religious beliefs under the Free 
Exercise of Religion Clause of the First Amendment.10  In addition, every state 
has confidentiality statutes protecting disclosure of employee information and 
constitutional provisions similar to those in the Federal Constitution.11 
II.  TEACHERS AND SCHOOL BOARDS: RIGHT TO PRIVACY VS. CONTROL 
This article will examine teacher privacy and the authority of school 
boards to control teachers.  The discussion of this topic will address four areas: 
 
 5. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53. 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property . . .”). 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause . . .”). 
 8. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (“[w]e have long understood as 
implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding 
right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, 
educational, religious, and cultural ends.”). 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . .”). 
 10. Id. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof”). 
 11. For the differing approaches of two states, cf. S. Bend Tribune v. S. Bend Community 
Sch. Corp., 740 N.E.2d 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (under state Public Records Act, school board 
was not required to reveal information about job applicants) with State ex rel. Dayton 
Newspapers v. Dayton Bd. of Educ., 747 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (under State Public 
Records Act, school board was required to reveal names, applications, and resumes of candidates 
for position of superintendent). But see State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Cincinnati Bd. of 
Educ., 788 N.E.2d 629 (Ohio 2003) (school district did not have to reveal to media employment 
application materials submitted to board members during executive session, but returned to each 
applicant at end of interview where materials had never been “kept” by board under state Public 
Records Act in order to make them public records). 
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personal privacy, physical privacy, instructional privacy, and associational 
privacy. 
A. Personal Privacy 
A teacher’s personal life, as for most persons, touches upon a variety of 
areas, from choice of clothes and accessories12 to sexual orientation.13 While 
teachers have considerable latitude in making personal choices, state interest in 
avoiding Establishment Clause violations has been sufficient to uphold statutes 
prohibiting the wearing of religious garb in schools.14  Similarly, teachers’ 
challenges to dress codes requiring that they wear certain kinds of apparel have 
withstood constitutional privacy scrutiny.15 The Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals in upholding a teacher dress code reasoned that: 
Just as the individual has an interest in a choice among different styles of 
appearance and behavior, and a democratic society has an interest in fostering 
diverse choices, so also does society have a legitimate interest in placing limits 
on the exercise of that choice.16 
However, newer areas of litigation concerning discrimination involving 
transsexual17 and transvestite18 individuals have recognized that, while choice 
of appearance is not a fundamental right, employers must have a rational basis 
 
 12. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bd. of Educ. for the Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 911 F.2d 882, 893-94 
(3d Cir. 1990) (enforcement of Pennsylvania’s religious garb statute prohibiting wearing of 
religious apparel, could be enforced against a Muslim teacher over against Title VII 
discrimination claim); Nichol v. ARIN Intermediate Unit 28, 268 F. Supp. 2d 536, 540, 560-61 
(W.D.Pa. 2003) (elementary school instructional assistant suspended for wearing a cross, 1 & 
7/16 inches in length and 15/16 inches in width, around her neck granted preliminary injunction 
reinstating her where court determined that she was likely to prevail on claim that school board’s 
religious affiliations policy prohibiting the wearing of religious jewelry violated the Free Exercise 
Clause and the Free Speech Clause as a form of personal expressive speech on a matter of public 
concern). 
 13. See Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 948 (7th Cir. 2002); Lovell v. 
Comsewogue Sch. Dist., 214 F. Supp. 2d 319, 322 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (teachers had protection 
under Equal Protection Clause for alleged discriminatory treatment regarding sexual orientation). 
 14. See generally Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 911 F.2d at 891; Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 
No. 41, 723 P.2d 298, 308, 311 (Or. 1986). 
 15. See East Hartford Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of Town of East Hartford, 562 F.2d 838, 
855 (2d Cir. 1977) (school board teacher dress code requiring that men wear coats and ties 
upheld); Tardiff v. Quinn, 545 F.2d 761, 764 (1st Cir. 1976) (dismissal of teacher for too-short 
skirts upheld). 
 16. East Hartford, 562 F.2d at 862. 
 17. See Lie v. Sky Pub. Corp., 2002 WL 31492397 at *1-*2 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2002)  (a 
transsexual is a person with the physical and genetic characteristics of one gender but who 
emotionally and mentally wants to be a member of the other sex). 
 18. Id. at *2 (a transvestite, or cross-dresser, is a person who wears the clothes of the 
opposite sex).  See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS (“DSM-IV”) 533 (4th ed. 1994). 
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for their apparel decisions.19  In a non-education case, the Illinois Supreme 
Court struck down a Chicago ordinance prohibiting a person from wearing 
clothing of the opposite sex with intent to conceal his or her sex.20  The court 
found that the ordinance’s purpose in prohibiting cross-dressing to prevent 
fraud on the public lacked a rational basis and was “fundamentally 
inconsistent” with “values of privacy, self-identity, autonomy, and personal 
integrity that . . . the Constitution was designed to protect.”21  Generally 
though, claims regarding what is referred to as “gender non-conformity” have 
come to be addressed in discrimination actions under federal or state law rather 
than under the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 22 
Reported case law thus far involving privacy rights of teachers and gender 
non-conformity is minimal,23 in large part because federal statutes prohibiting 
discrimination do not designate gender non-conformity as a protected category.  
However, the Supreme Court’s pivotal case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins24 has 
had the effect of encouraging a rethinking of protected categories.25  In Price 
Waterhouse, the Court broadened the understanding of “sex” under Title VII26 
to include stereotypical thinking about the employee based on sex.27  Since 
Price Waterhouse, at least two federal circuits have weighed in, finding that 
sex under federal statutes encompasses both biological differences between 
men and women as well as actions based on failure to conform to socially-
prescribed gender expectations.28  However, at least one other federal circuit 
 
 19. See, e.g., Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (1st Cir. 1970). 
 20. City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 525 (Ill. 1978). 
 21. Id. at 531 (quoting Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 251 (1976) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting)). 
 22. See, e.g., Lie, 2002 WL 31492397 at *4. 
 23. For an example of an attenuated employee gender non-conformity case, see Cruzan v. 
Special School Dist. No. 1, 294 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2002) (Eighth Circuit rejected female teacher’s 
claim that the school’s permitting a transgendered male to use the female teachers’ restroom 
constituted religious discrimination). 
 24. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 25. Lie, 2002 WL 31492397 at *3. 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2004).  Employers are prohibited from “fail[ing] or 
refus[ing] to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . .”  Id. 
 27. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.  In a promotion review, one partner “described [the 
plaintiff in Price Waterhouse] as ‘macho’; another suggested that she ‘overcompensated for being 
a woman’; a third advised her to take ‘a course at charm school.’”  Id.  Furthermore, the partner 
who informed the plaintiff of the decision not to promote her advised her to “walk more 
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”  Id. 
 28. See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2000) (pre-operative male-
to-female prisoner had section 1983 claims under Eighth Amendment and Gender Motivated 
Violence Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (2004), as a result of rape by a guard); Rosa v. Park West 
Bank & Trust, 214 F.3d 213, 214-15 (1st Cir. 2000) (biological man who was denied a loan 
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continues to define “sex” to mean “biological male or biological female” and 
not one’s sexuality or sexual orientation.29 
As a general rule, the status of gender non-conformity under federal law or 
the Federal Constitution has become irrelevant because many states, local 
municipalities, and school districts have acted to afford protection.30  In 
addition, the increasing number of successful harassment law suits, brought 
largely by students for damages under section 1983 and the Equal Protection 
Clause, has unquestionably mandated attention from school board members, 
administrators, and teachers, with the likelihood that the climate generally 
regarding gender non-conformity will change in schools.31 
The effect of the recent Supreme Court decision Lawrence v. Texas32 on 
privacy issues relevant to gender non-conformity remains to be seen.  In 
Lawrence, the Court reversed the criminal conviction of two men for violating 
Texas’s anti-sodomy statute.33  Although the defendants raised a number of 
constitutional arguments, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, resolved 
the case solely on the ground of whether “the petitioners were free as adults to 
 
application because he was dressed in traditionally female clothing established a prima facie case 
of sex discrimination under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2004), 
sufficient to avoid a motion to dismiss).  For two cases from the same circuit prior to Price 
Waterhouse, see Blackwell v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 830 F.2d 1183, 1183-84 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(recognizing an employment discrimination claim based on the handicap of transvestitism as 
covered by the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (FRA), 29 U.S.C. § 701-96, on the basis of 
transvestitism); Doe v. United States Postal Service, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1867 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985) (plaintiff had an employment discrimination claim under the FRA on the basis of 
transexualism).  However, FRA was amended in 1990 to exclude “gender identity disorders not 
resulting from physical impairments.”  29 U.S.C. § 705(8)(F)(i) (2000).  For similar language 
under the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), see 42 U.S.C. § 12208 (2000). 
 29. Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1084 (7th Cir. 2000) (interpreting “sex” 
under Title VII). 
 30. See, e.g., Goins v. West Group, Inc., 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001) (transgender former 
employee had sexual orientation claim under state’s Human Rights Act); MADISON, WIS., 
MADISON CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 3.23 available at http://www.ci.madison.wi.us/eGov (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2004) (sexual orientation protected under city ordinance).  
 31. See, e.g., Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 
2003) (students who experienced anti-gay name-calling remarks could sue school officials for 
failing to enforce anti-harassment policy); Massey v. Banning Unified Sch. Dist., 256 F. Supp. 2d 
1090, 1091, 1093-94, 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (eighth grade student barred from physical education 
class after she revealed that she was lesbian had equal protection claim, and school officials not 
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Gay-Straight Alliance Network v. Visalia Unified 
Sch. Dist., 262 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095-96, 1098, 1111 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (students subjected to a 
variety of forms of harassment based on their sexual orientation had § 1983 and Equal Protection 
Clause claims against school officials for failing to address the harassment). 
 32. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
 33. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003) (prohibits “deviate sexual 
intercourse” between members of the same sex).  In this case, the sexual intercourse in question 
involved anal intercourse between two males.  Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475-76. 
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engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due 
Process Clause. . . .”34  He cautioned states against controlling relationships 
that “whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, [are] within the 
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”35  Finally, 
because the act in this case occurred in a home, he opined that “adults may 
choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their 
own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.”36  In overruling 
Bowers v. Harwick,37 in which the Court upheld a conviction under Georgia’s 
anti-sodomy law, Justice Kennedy observed that the Court in Bowers 
incorrectly stated the key issue as being “whether the Federal Constitution 
confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”38  In his 
opinion, this mistake demonstrated the Court’s “failure to appreciate the extent 
of the liberty at stake.”39 
The extent to which Lawrence will affect privacy rights involving gender 
non-conformity of teachers is not clear and will probably not be clear for some 
time.  Justice Kennedy’s observation that Lawrence did not involve minors40 
suggests the obvious, namely that Lawrence is not likely to provide privacy 
protection for teachers convicted for committing sexual acts with students. 
Aside from this obvious limitation, what implications might Lawrence have for 
teachers in school settings? 
Justice Kennedy’s observation that the case did not address “whether the 
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual 
persons seek to enter”41 suggests possible tensions among teacher privacy 
rights, federalism, and local school board control over education.  For example, 
if states are free to prohibit homosexual marriages and are not required by the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause42 to recognize such marriages from other states, 
what are the implications for teacher privacy rights concerning gender non-
conformity in the classroom?43  If State “A” does not permit homosexual 
 
 34. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476. 
 35. Id. at 2478. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187-89 (1986). 
 38. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 2484. 
 41. Id. 
 42. U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 1 (“Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State . . .”). 
 43. See, e.g., Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 172 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (upholding 
dismissal of an action seeking to dissolve a civil union marriage entered into in Vermont pursuant 
to that state’s civil union statute, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1202 (2002)).  The court observed that 
because Connecticut recognized only marriage unions between men and women, courts in the 
state lacked jurisdiction to dissolve a homosexual union.  However, the court skirted the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause issue because all of plaintiff’s contacts were with Connecticut and the 
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marriages and a teacher from State “A” enters into a marriage in State “B” that 
does permit such, could a school district in State “A” discharge the teacher?  
Does Justice Kennedy’s statement in Lawrence that petitioners were “entitled 
to respect for their private lives”44 provide broad protection for teachers, or 
will Lawrence be limited to its facts, namely protecting acts occurring only in 
the home, as opposed to a school?45  The key question yet unresolved is the 
extent to which the Lawrence Court, in overturning the criminal convictions, 
placed homosexuality (and in a broader sense, all gender non-conformity) on 
the same constitutional footing as traditional patterns of heterosexuality.46  A 
broad reading of Lawrence suggests that Liberty Clause privacy rights may 
well extend to most forms of gender non-conformity.  If so, school boards, for 
example, would have to provide a constitutionally sufficient rational basis for 
making employment decisions regarding gender non-conformity.47 
B. Physical Privacy 
Physical privacy for teachers, as for other employees, means intrusion into 
their persons and property, particularly as related to searches of a person’s 
property and searches in the form of requiring urine samples for drug testing 
purposes.  Searches are intrusions on a person’s privacy, and the Fourth 
 
only contact that plaintiff had with Vermont was entering into the civil union.  Id. at 174-75, 178-
79. 
 44. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484. 
 45. See id. at 2478.  Because the criminal convictions resulted from an act occurring in a 
home, the application of Lawrence to places other than the home is not clear in light of Justice 
Kennedy’s observation that the prohibited conduct touched “upon the most private human 
conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private places, the home.”  Id. 
 46. The Lawrence Court relied on Griswold v. Connecticut, in which the Court invalidated, 
on privacy grounds, a state statute prohibiting the use of contraceptive drugs, contraception, or 
counseling for married persons. 381 U.S. 479, 480, 485 (1965).  However, in a subsequent case, 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court, in striking down a law prohibiting the distribution of 
contraceptives for unmarried persons, appeared to expand privacy protection noting that although 
the Griswold Court placed emphasis on the marriage relationship and the marital bedroom, “[i]f 
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free 
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the 
decision whether to bear or beget a child.” 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1973) (emphasis in original). 
 47. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1099, 1102-03, 1110 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding 
that Georgia Attorney General withdrawing an offer of employment after finding out about 
candidate’s lesbian marriage was not subject to strict scrutiny, and Attorney General had 
sufficient interest in promoting efficiency of important public service under Pickering balancing 
test to reject candidate.)  For an example of balancing free speech rights involving expression 
about gender non-conformity, see Downs v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (holding that a teacher opposed to homosexuality was not permitted to create his own 
bulletin board in the hallway to counter the school’s board on gay and lesbian month on which 
faculty were permitted to post items).  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the school’s bulletin board 
represented government speech and the teacher had no right to post different viewpoints about 
speech on which the school had expressed a viewpoint.  Id. at 1016-17. 
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Amendment ensures that a person’s expectation of privacy will not be intruded 
upon by government officers unless probable cause exists.48 
However, not all public places are the same in terms of an expectation of 
privacy, as the Supreme Court indicated in three student search cases involving 
drugs, New Jersey v. T.L.O.,49 Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,50 and 
Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie 
County v. Earls.51  The Court held in all three cases that probable cause did not 
apply to searches of students by school officials and that officials needed only 
reasonable suspicion to conduct a search.52  As the Supreme Court has yet to 
decide a school employee search and seizure case, the question becomes the 
extent to which diminished expectation of privacy for students, in large part 
because of the confined and custodial nature of schools, should also apply to 
teachers. 
In T.L.O., where the Court upheld an individualized suspicion search of a 
girl’s purse that produced evidence of drug dealing, the Court, for the first 
time, articulated that student searches required only reasonable suspicion but 
had to be reasonable both as to inception of the search and the scope of the 
search.53  Thus, in T.L.O., a charge by the teacher that T.L.O. was smoking in 
the restroom, along with the girl’s denial that she had been smoking, provided 
reasonable suspicion to open the purse and to look for cigarettes and, upon 
seeing and removing a pack of cigarettes, to continue the search when drug-
related items were seen.54 
The T.L.O. Court found the probable cause standard of the Fourth 
Amendment “unsuited to the school environment” because a requirement that 
school officials secure a search warrant before conducting student searches 
“would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal 
disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.”55  In finding that reasonable 
suspicion, despite diminishing the privacy rights of students, was an 
appropriate standard because of “the substantial need of teachers and 
 
 48. See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (Court refused to create a “firearms 
exception” to reliable informant requirement for a probable cause search, where police had 
received an anonymous phone call that resulted in a gun being found). 
 49. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
 50. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
 51. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 
(2002). 
 52. Id. at 828-29; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652-53; T.L.O., 469 U.S. 340-41. 
 53. Reasonable suspicion “is not a requirement of absolute certainty.”  T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 
346.  The Court found that “[b]ecause the hypothesis that T.L.O. was carrying cigarettes in her 
purse was itself not unreasonable, it is irrelevant that other hypotheses were also consistent with 
the teacher’s accusation.”  Id. 
 54. Id. at 346-47. 
 55. Id. at 340. 
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administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools,”56 could the Court 
apply that holding to teachers as well? 
In Earls, the Court, reinforcing its decision in Vernonia by upholding 
mandatory universal and random drug testing for students participating in 
extracurricular activities, observed that individualized suspicion for a search 
was not required because of “the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility 
for children.”57  The Earls Court opined that “[w]hile school children do not 
shed their constitutional rights when they enter the schoolhouse” under Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,58 the Court in 
Vernonia added that “Fourth Amendment rights . . . are different in public 
schools than elsewhere.”59  Clearly, the context for diminished privacy in 
T.L.O., Vernonia, and Earls involves students, but one can argue that setting a 
lower reasonable suspicion standard for students and requiring a higher 
probable cause standard for teacher searches in the same school environment 
would be inconsistent and anomalous.60  Because teacher constitutional rights 
in schools owe their origin to the same Tinker Court decision as for students,61 
teacher rights, arguably, should be subject to the same ebb and flow of 
Supreme Court interpretation as for student rights. 
In the absence of a Supreme Court decision addressing school employee 
search and seizure, the closest case is O’Connor v. Ortega where the Court, 
relying heavily on T.L.O., set forth guidelines for search and seizure of public 
employee property.62  In O’Connor, public hospital supervisors conducted a 
search of the office of a doctor in charge of residents, purportedly looking for 
evidence of alleged sexual harassment and suspected coercion of past residents 
to donate money for the doctor’s new computer.  The search, which involved 
mainly looking through the doctor’s personal possessions, revealed no 
 
 56. Id. at 341. 
 57. Earls, 536 U.S. at 830 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656). 
 58. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 
(1969)). 
 59. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656. 
 60. Of note is the qualification in Tinker where, in granting constitutional rights to teachers 
as well as students, the Court made the grant “in light of the special characteristics of the school 
environment . . . .” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
 61. Tinker is an interesting decision because the case involved only student litigants and 
teachers were not a party to the lawsuit; nonetheless, the Court chose to gratuitously accord rights 
to teachers at the same time it did for students. 
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school 
environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either 
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at 
the schoolhouse gate. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 62. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (all facts in this section are taken from 
pages 712-14 of the Court’s opinion). 
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evidence of either allegation.  When completed, the doctor’s personal 
possessions and hospital property were boxed together, and despite the 
supervisors’ claim that they entered the office in part to take inventory, no 
inventory in fact was taken. 
In applying T.L.O., the Court in O’Connor opined that the employer must 
“balance the invasion of the employee’s legitimate expectations of privacy 
against the government’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient 
operation of the workplace.”63  The Court defined workplace broadly so as to 
include all of those areas over which the employer exerts control, which for 
teachers could include areas such as hallways, break rooms, desks, file 
cabinets, and classrooms.64 
An employee’s expectation of privacy is determined by the circumstances 
of the workplace, which the O’Connor Court indicated is influenced by the 
amount of access employees have to an area.65  In O’Connor, the Court 
suggested that the employee had a greater expectation of privacy where he did 
not share his locked office with other employees,66 a marked difference, one 
could argue, from a teacher’s classroom where school administrators, other 
teachers, substitute teachers, janitors, and students have ready access to the 
room.67  The O’Connor Court also observed that the hospital had no policy 
regarding personal items at the workplace, although the Court cautioned that 
absence of such a policy did not create an expectation of privacy where one 
would not otherwise exist.68  In other words, personal items, such as pictures 
and letters on a teacher’s desk, are still part of the workplace and might be the 
subject of a search. 
Applying the T.L.O. requirement of reasonableness for a search as to 
inception and scope, the O’Connor Court found reasonable grounds for 
searching an employee’s office to include finding a record, report, or file, 
conducting an inventory of items in the office, and investigating alleged 
misconduct.69  The scope of a search in the workplace was more problematic 
for the Court, and it cautioned that a workplace did not necessarily apply to a 
 
 63. Id. at 719-20. 
 64. Id. at 715-16. 
 65. Id. 
 66. However, even locked offices would have a diminished expectation of privacy if they 
“are continually entered by fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for 
conferences, consultations, and other work-related visits . . . .  [S]ome government offices may be 
so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable.”  Id. at 
717, 718. 
 67. Accord see Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 218 F. Supp. 2d 266 
(N.D.N.Y. 2002) (school district not liable for allegedly not returning personal items of a teacher 
discharged for misconduct with students because teacher had been given two opportunities to 
remove the items and had failed to do so). 
 68. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 719. 
 69. Id. at 725-26. 
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piece of closed personal luggage, a handbag, or a briefcase that happens to be 
within the employee’s workspace.70  Whether an employer could search 
personal items would depend on whether the particular items for which the 
search has been conducted might reasonably be located in the places being 
searched. 
Ultimately, the search in O’Connor failed the test under T.L.O. because it 
was “at best, a general and unbounded pursuit of anything that might tend to 
indicate any sort of malfeasance – a search that is almost by definition, 
unreasonable.”71  Seventeen years after filing his lawsuit for unlawful search 
and seizure (and eleven years after the Supreme Court decision), the doctor 
who had been discharged recovered $376,000 in compensatory damages and 
$60,000 in punitive damages against the two supervisors.72 
Cases applying the search principles of T.L.O. and O’Connor to school 
employees are rare.  However, a recent Ohio appeals court decision examined 
employees’ expectation of privacy where a building principal, suspecting third 
shift janitors of taking unauthorized breaks, installed a hidden video camera in 
a break room.73  The videotape revealed that janitors were taking unauthorized 
breaks and, upon being disciplined, they challenged the videotaping as an 
unlawful search.  In upholding the principal’s action, the court observed that 
the janitors could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in a break room 
that was accessible to all employees and contained a washing machine, a 
clothes dryer, cleaning supplies, lockers, a refrigerator, and a microwave 
oven.74  The inception of the search was justified by the principal’s reasonable 
suspicion about the unauthorized breaks, and the scope of the search was 
acceptable because it was less intrusive than it could have been as the principal 
had turned off the sound and recorded only the visual images.75 
Both T.L.O. and O’Connor suggest that teachers would have a reduced 
expectation of privacy regarding most places in schools, at least as to 
classrooms where teachers work and file cabinets where teachers store items.  
In such places, school officials would need only reasonable suspicion that the 
search would turn up evidence of work-related misconduct or work-related 
items such as records or files.  The scope of a search would meet Fourth 
Amendment requirements as long as the measures adopted for the search are 
reasonably related to the search’s objectives and are not excessively intrusive 
 
 70. Id. at 716. 
 71. Ortega v. O’Connor, 146 F.3d 1149, 1163 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 72. See id. at 1154. 
 73. Brannen v. Kings Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 761 N.E.2d 84 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) 
(all facts in this section are taken from page 88 of the court’s opinion). 
 74. Id. at 92. 
 75. Id. at 92-93. 
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“in light of . . . the nature of the [misconduct].”76  Relying on T.L.O., the 
O’Connor Court held that: 
Public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests 
of government employees for non-investigatory, work-related purposes, as 
well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the 
standard of reasonableness.77 
The Court is silent as to the appropriate standard for searches of personal 
places such as teacher purses or brief cases.  However, it is arguable that the 
reasonable suspicion, inception, and scope tests from T.L.O. would apply in 
much the same way as for students. 
Suspicionless searches of teachers would be difficult to justify using the 
student cases of Vernonia and Earls.  In those cases, the Supreme Court 
supported drug testing for students in extracurricular activities because 
participation was voluntary and because the extracurricular groups had rules 
not applicable to non-participating students.78  If students chose not to 
participate, or decided to cease participation, suspicionless searches would no 
longer apply and searches of those students could only be conducted under 
T.L.O.’s individualized suspicion standard.79  If suspicionless searches are to 
be used for teachers, they obviously need a different legal rationale than the 
one used for students. 
Although a number of courts have upheld the use of random drug tests for 
janitors80 and school bus workers,81 the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Knox County 
Education Association v. Knox County Board of Education82 is the highest 
court decision to date upholding random drug testing for teachers.  The court in 
Knox County likened teachers to other “safety sensitive” positions, such as 
customs employees and railway employees, positions for which the Supreme 
 
 76. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325, 342 (1985)). 
 77. Id. at 725. 
 78. Earls, 536 U.S. at  831-32. 
 79. Although the Earls Court does not specifically reach this result, the Court’s observation 
that the results of the drug tests were not “turned over to any law enforcement authority” and did 
not “lead to the imposition of discipline or have any academic consequences” suggests very 
strongly that positive test results could not be used for the same kind of discipline associated with 
individualized suspicion.  Id. at 833.  See also Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch. Dist., 133 F. 
Supp. 2d 919, 930 (N.D.Tex. 2001) (court invalidated school drug testing policy that applied to 
all students in junior and senior high schools); Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 
1109-10 (Colo. 1998) (court struck down random drug testing policy as applied to students 
involved in marching band for which academic credit was awarded). 
 80. See Aubrey v. Sch. Bd. of Lafeyette Parish, 148 F.3d 559, 561 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 81. See English v. Talledaga County Bd. of Educ., 938 F. Supp. 775, 782-83 (N.D.Ala. 
1996). 
 82. See Knox County Educ. Ass’n v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 366-70 (6th 
Cir. 1998). 
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Court has upheld random drug testing.83  The Sixth Circuit found that a school 
board has a very strong interest in having teachers (and administrators) sober 
and not under the influence of drugs, because they must act immediately to 
protect students when a dangerous event occurs and because they are in “a 
unique position to observe children and learn if they are involved in activities 
which can lead to harm or injury to themselves or others.”84  The court 
determined that the teachers’ expectation of privacy was diminished because 
the taking of a drug sample was not intrusive and because the teaching 
profession is highly regulated.85  The teachers’ concerns regarding the 
intrusiveness of the drug test was satisfied because providing the drug sample 
could be done in private without monitoring, except in cases where there is 
reason to believe a teacher will adulterate the sample.86  The court also 
observed that “when people enter the education profession they do so with the 
understanding that the profession is heavily regulated as to the conduct of 
people in the field, as well as to the responsibilities that they undertake toward 
their students and colleagues . . . .”87  As a result, “teachers should not be 
surprised if their own use of drugs is subject to regulation and testing . . . .”88 
Absent state statutes, collective bargaining agreements, or school board 
policies regulating teacher searches,89 the expectation of privacy that teachers 
have in their person or property follows the standard already set forth 
regarding students.  Although only one federal appeals court has thus far ruled, 
suspicionless searches (drug testing) do not appear to be excessively intrusive 
on the privacy of teachers and are constitutionally permissible, although the 
justification for such testing differs from the one given for the testing of 
students. 
C. Instructional Privacy 
The U.S. Supreme Court has given considerable authority to local school 
boards and school administrators to control schools.  Teachers’ claims that 
they should be left alone in the classroom to instruct according to their own 
 
 83. See generally Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raub, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (for 
customs employees); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (for railway 
workers). 
 84. Knox County, 158 F.3d at 379. 
 85. Id. at 379-84. 
 86. Id. at 380. 
 87. Id. at 384. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See, e.g., Hearn v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 191 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) (school 
board policy providing for teacher consent for a search warrant for search of teacher’s personal 
property, in this case a car in the parking lot, not applicable where the basis for school official’s 
ordering a teacher to take a drug test occurred outside the parameters of the policy). 
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instructional techniques and methodologies have been framed under a variety 
of constitutional theories: privacy, free speech, and free exercise of religion. 
Among the responsibilities of school administrators are the evaluation and 
supervision of teachers, which under state law and/or collective bargaining 
agreements generally require that administrators observe teachers in the 
classroom.90  The extent to which teachers have protectable privacy interests in 
their classrooms has not been extensively litigated.  However, the limited case 
law available indicates that the interest school administrators and school 
boards have in knowing what teachers are doing in the classroom and how they 
are performing overrides whatever privacy interests a teacher might have, even 
if classroom observations result in discipline. 
In Roberts v. Houston Independent School District, a Texas appellate court 
permitted a school board to use a 30-minute videotape which included excerpts 
of five separate videotapes made of a teacher’s classroom as the evidence for 
the termination of the teacher for inefficiency or incompetence. 91  The court 
observed that the teacher had no right of privacy to be free from intrusion into 
her classroom for purposes of videotaping her teaching, even though she had 
objected to the videotaping.92  In upholding dismissal of the teacher, the court 
in Roberts reasoned that “the activity of teaching in a public classroom does 
not fall within the expected zone of privacy” and that this reasoning even 
applies when “involuntary videotaping” of a teacher’s performance occurs.93  
The court also noted that the teacher “was videotaped in full view of her 
students, faculty members and administrators [and] at no point did the school 
district attempt to record [the teacher’s] private affairs.”94 
In Evens v. Superior Court, a California appellate court held that a 
videotape surreptitiously taken by students of a teacher could be viewed by a 
school board for purposes of determining whether the teacher should be 
disciplined.95  The court brushed aside the teacher’s claim that, under state law, 
evidence of “a confidential communication” cannot be used in any 
administrative or judicial proceeding.96  The court’s response was that “the 
videotape recording at issue here was made in a public classroom” and was 
therefore not considered “a confidential communication.”97  In addition, the 
 
 90. See, e.g., Naylor v. Cardinal Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 630 N.E.2d 725, 728-29 
(Ohio 1994) (school board failed to satisfy statutory requirement regarding evaluation of teacher 
and therefore her probationary period was extended one additional year in order for board to 
properly provide appropriate evaluation). 
 91. Roberts v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 788 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990). 
 92. Id. at 111. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Evens v. Super. Ct., 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 497, 500 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). 
 96. Id. at 499; CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(d) (West 1999). 
 97. Evens, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 499. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] SCHOOL BOARD CONTROL OVER EDUCATION 623 
court found inapplicable a criminal statute that prohibited the use of any 
electronic listening or recording device made in a classroom without the 
consent of “the teacher and the principal.”98  Despite statutory language that 
any person other than a pupil committing a prohibited act was guilty of a 
misdemeanor and “any pupil violating this section shall be subject to 
disciplinary action,” the court determined that nothing in the act “prohibit[ed] 
entities such as the [School] Board and [School] District from using videotape 
recordings made by students in violation of the statute in disciplinary 
actions.”99  In general, the court opined that, because students generally discuss 
their teacher’s actions with parents, administrators, and other students, “a 
teacher must always expect ‘public dissemination’ of his or her classroom 
‘communications and activities.’”100 
Teachers also argue under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment 
in protesting interference with their conduct in the classroom.  As with cases 
involving physical privacy, Supreme Court guidance involving free speech 
comes not from school employee cases, but from two decisions involving 
students, Bethel School District No. 402 v. Fraser101 and Hazelwood School 
District v. Kuhlmeier.102 
In Bethel, the Supreme Court expanded the authority of schools to punish 
student speech that is vulgar.103  The Bethel Court upheld suspension of a 
student who delivered a brief speech containing sexual innuendo.104  The 
campaign speech, made on behalf of another student, was delivered in the 
school auditorium where other students were in attendance.105  Although the 
disruption from the speech was minimal, the Court rejected the student’s free 
 
 98. Id.; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51512 (West 1989). 
 99. Evens, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 499; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51512 (West 1989). 
 100. Evens, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 499. 
 101. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 102. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 103. See Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685-86. 
 104. Id. at 685, 687 (Brennan, J., concurring). The speech was as follows: 
“I know a man who is firm — he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character is 
firm — but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.” 
“Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he’ll take an 
issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t attack things in spurts — he drives hard, pushing 
and pushing until finally — he succeeds.” 
“Jeff is a man who will go to the very end — even the climax, for each and every one of 
you.” 
“So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president — he’ll never come between you and the best 
our high school can be.” 
Id. 
 105. Id. at 677. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
624 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:609 
expression claim, reasoning that punishing such speech furthered the school’s 
interest in “inculcat[ing] the habits and manners of civility.”106 
Two years later in Hazelwood, the Court upheld a school principal’s 
decision to delete two pages of a school newspaper prepared by students.107  
The principal objected to two articles, one of which dealt with teen 
pregnancies, and even though the girls were not identified, he was concerned 
that they could be identified and their confidentiality violated.  In addition “he 
also believed that the article’s references to sexual activity and birth control 
were inappropriate for some of the younger students the school.”108  The 
second article dealt with a student’s negative comments about her father 
regarding her parents’ divorce.109  The principal was concerned that the author 
of the article had not interviewed the father.  Because the principal did not 
believe that sufficient time existed to make the changes and print the paper, he 
deleted two pages of the paper containing the two articles in question in 
addition to several others.  In rejecting students’ free expression claims, the 
Court reasoned that school administrators could act reasonably to edit the 
student newspaper because it was part of the regular curriculum of the 
journalism class.110  Relying on Bethel, the Court observed that “a school need 
not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic educational 
mission’ . . . even though the government could not censor similar speech 
outside the school.”111  In addition, as part of the curriculum, students could be 
expected to follow appropriate journalistic standards.112  The Court reasoned 
broadly that: 
[e]ducators are entitled to exercise greater control over this second form of 
student expression to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the 
activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to 
material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the 
views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.113 
Although the the Supreme Court granted broad discretion to school boards 
in Bethel and Hazelwood to regulate student expression in public schools, 
lower courts have relied on these cases to permit boards to regulate teacher 
 
 106. Id. at 681. 
 107. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 274 (all facts in this section are taken from pages 262-64 of the 
Court’s opinion). 
 108. Id. at 263. 
 109. Id.  The principal’s concerns were that “the divorce story had complained that her father 
‘wasn’t spending enough time with my mom, my sister and I’ prior to the divorce, ‘was always 
out of town on business or out late playing cards with the guys,’ and ‘always argued about 
everything’ with her mother.”  Id. 
 110. Id. at 273. 
 111. Id. at 266. 
 112. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 268. 
 113. Id. at 271. 
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expression during the school day and the content of their classroom 
instruction.114  Efforts under a variety of legal theories by teachers to change or 
to personalize school curriculum have generally been rejected. 
In Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized School District,115 the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of an English and Journalism teacher 
who permitted her students, as part of their junior English class, to perform and 
videotape a class play containing repeated profanity, contrary to a school 
disciplinary code prohibiting student use of profanity.116  In reversing a 
$500,000 jury verdict for the teacher on her free speech claim, the Eighth 
Circuit, finding support in both Bethel and Hazelwood, held as a matter of law 
that “the school board had a legitimate academic interest in prohibiting 
profanity by students in their creative writing . . . .  A flat prohibition of 
profanity in the classroom is reasonably related to the legitimate pedagogical 
concern of promoting generally acceptable social standards.”117 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Boring v. Buncombe County 
Board of Education, reached a result similar to Lacks, upholding transfer of a 
drama teacher for permitting her students to perform a play containing “mature 
subject matter.”118  The Fourth Circuit, relying on Hazelwood, held that the 
teacher did not present a free speech claim because her selection and 
performance of the play “[did] not present a matter of public concern and [was] 
nothing more than an ordinary employment dispute.”119 
In a California case that tangentially implicated a teacher, a California 
statute provided the framework for students to challenge the school board’s 
requirement that the students delete profanity from a film that they had written, 
which had been approved by the teacher of their Film Arts class.120  Although 
the statute expressed the broad intent that students have “the right to exercise 
freedom of expression and the press,” it also charged the advisers of student 
publications “to maintain professional standards of English and journalism.”121  
The school district defined “profanity” in its regulations as “language which 
 
 114. See discussion below, infra notes 115-142 and accompanying text. 
 115. Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1998) (the Eighth 
Circuit cites to both Bethel and Hazelwood for authority that regulation of teacher speech can be 
done by public school boards as long as the regulation meets legitimate pedagogical interests). 
 116. The words used were “fuck,” “shit,” “ass,” “bitch,” and “nigger.”  Id. at 719. 
 117. Id. at 724. 
 118. Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998).  According to 
the teacher’s complaint, the play “powerfully depicts the dynamics within a dysfunctional, single-
family — a divorced mother and three daughters: one a lesbian, another pregnant with an 
illegitimate child.”  Id. at 366. 
 119. Id. at 368. 
 120. Lopez v. Tulare Joint Union High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trs., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762, 765  (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1995). 
 121. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West 1993). 
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would be used in the Tulare Advance-Register or the Fresno Bee.”122  Even 
though the statute prohibited school boards from disciplining students for 
engaging in protected speech, it did not prohibit a school board from requiring 
that students delete the language.123 
Teachers generally are limited in their ability to change school board 
curriculum by adding to or deleting material.  In Newton v. Slye, a federal 
district court in West Virginia held that a school administrator’s directive that 
an English teacher remove a “banned book” pamphlet from his class door was 
not a violation of free speech, even though the teacher could distribute the 
pamphlet in the classroom. 124  The court agreed with the administrator that the 
pamphlet was part of the curriculum which could be controlled under 
Hazelwood.125  The court observed that the school board had “taken steps to 
control exposure of children to unsuitable matter” as reflected in the use of a 
district-wide filtering system and special curricular programs such as Family 
Life Education, Character Counts, the Code of Responsible Student Conduct, 
and a Substance Abuse Policy.126  Posting the pamphlet, rather than handing it 
out in class, sent a message at odds with a school curriculum “based on 
community values . . . by the school board.”127 
Similarly, in Murray v. Pittsburgh Board of Education, a teacher in an 
Alternative Learning Center who was a proponent of a classroom management 
technique known as Learnball could be ordered by her principal to stop using 
the technique and to remove all Learnball literature, symbols, and 
paraphernalia from her classroom. 128  In response to the teacher’s claim that 
her free speech rights had been violated, the court observed that “a public 
school classroom is a nonpublic forum,” and the principal had “the authority to 
make all of the school’s administrative and educational decisions . . . .”129  The 
mere fact that the principal has permitted teachers to decorate their rooms does 
not mean that they have transformed the classroom into a limited public forum 
for the expressive activity of teachers.  Because the principal had a reasonable 
basis for not favoring the Learnball approach based upon the technique’s ill-fit 
within the school’s curricular objectives, the prohibition was permissible 
because it did not represent viewpoint discrimination.130 
Although school boards have broad authority to control instruction in 
classrooms, that authority applies only where teachers have been made aware 
 
 122. Lopez, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 765 n.3. 
 123. Id. at 768; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West 1993). 
 124. Newton v. Slye, 116 F. Supp. 2d 677, 684 (W.D. Va. 2000). 
 125. Id. at 685. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Murray v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub. Educ., 919 F. Supp. 838, 844-45 (W.D. Pa. 1996). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 844. 
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of board policies.  In disputes involving a teacher’s knowledge of school board 
policies, the teacher is likely to prevail against a school board under a free 
speech claim, when the policy under which the board acts in disciplining a 
teacher is vague and unenforceable or has never been distributed to the 
teachers.  In Wilder v. Board of Education of Jefferson County School District, 
a teacher, terminated for showing an “R” rated film without following the 
school board’s written controversial materials policy, succeeded in reversing 
his termination where the policy was not in the teacher handbook, most 
teachers were not aware of it, and the school’s principal did not believe that the 
policy applied to the teacher.131  Although school boards can regulate teacher 
classroom speech that is related to a legitimate pedagogical concern, they can 
do so only when the teacher has received notice of what conduct is prohibited.  
In a somewhat strained constitutional analysis, the court found that a teacher 
does have a First Amendment interest in choosing a particular pedagogical 
method for a course, but only to the extent to which the board has not clearly 
expressed its pedagogical choices.132 
Occasionally, teachers claim that they have a right under free exercise of 
religion to inject personal religious elements into a classroom.  Courts 
consistently find that teachers’ inclusion of religion is not a protected activity 
because it violates the Establishment Clause.133  Thus, in Marchi v. Board of 
Cooperative Services of Albany, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld 
the directive of a director of special education to a teacher that: 
Public schools are prohibited from offering instruction in support of religious 
beliefs or practices.  Your personal beliefs about the role of religion in our 
society and its value to families and their children cannot be a part of the 
instruction given to your students.134 
In asserting that a teacher “does not retain the full extent of free exercise rights 
that he would enjoy as a private citizen,” the Second Circuit observed that a 
teacher’s religious responses to student questions in the classroom135 must give 
 
 131. Wilder v. Bd. of Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 944 P.2d 598 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).  
The film, 1900, focusing on Italian life through the end of World War II, contained scenes of 
nudity, sexual conduct, drug use, and violence.  Id. at 599 (all facts in this section are taken from 
pages 599-600 of the court’s opinion). 
 132. Id. at 603. 
 133. See, e.g., Marchi v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs. of Albany, 173 F.3d 469, 472 (2d Cir. 
1999). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Among the items considered objectionable were the teacher’s modification of his 
instructional program “to discuss topics such as forgiveness, reconciliation, and God,” and a letter 
to a parent that contained the following words: 
Ryan had a good day today. I thank you and the LORD for the tape; it brings the Spirit of 
Peace to the classroom. Tomorrow is a teacher’s conference and dismissal is at 11:30. 
May God Bless you all richly. 
Id. at 472-73. 
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way to an employer’s legitimate interest “in avoiding litigation by those 
contending that an employee’s desire to exercise his freedom of religion has 
propelled his employer into an Establishment Clause violation.”136 
In another case, school district officials could reassign a tenth-grade 
biology teacher to teach ninth-grade earth science after he refused to teach 
evolution.137 The court found little difficulty in concluding that the school 
administrators had an “important pedagogical interest in establishing the 
curriculum,” and in pursuit of that interest, the court reasoned that they had 
“remained religiously neutral.”138  Likewise, a substitute teacher could be 
removed from the substitute list for reading the Bible to a fifth grade class.139  
When the teacher alleged that the school board had engaged in religious 
discrimination in violation of Title VII,140 the court reasoned that school 
administrators’ “repeated warnings against interjecting his religious beliefs 
into the classroom [constituted] legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for 
dismissing him.”141 
Given the broad grant of authority the Supreme Court has bestowed upon 
school boards in Hazelwood and Bethel to control instruction, the rights of 
teachers to insert their personal views and instructional techniques are, at best, 
limited.142  That which occurs in the classroom is at the heart of the educational 
process, and teachers will be expected to conform to the instructional 
guidelines of school boards. 
D. Associational Privacy 
Teacher contacts with students either inside or outside school hours can be 
the subject of school board discipline.  Generally, the legal issues surrounding 
improper conduct involving a teacher and his or her students focus on the 
language of a state’s teacher dismissal statute, as opposed to teachers’ claims 
that their right of privacy to engage in conduct with students has been violated.  
Thus, under a broad penumbra of statutory language, including unprofessional 
conduct, unfitness, willful neglect of duty, and immorality, courts consistently 
 
 136. Id. at 476. 
 137. Levake v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 656, 625 N.W.2d 502, 507-08 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
 138. Id. 
 139. See Helland v. South Bend Community Sch. Corp., 93 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (2000). 
 141. Helland, 93 F.3d at 330. 
 142. Cf. Padilla v. South Harrison R-H Sch. Dist., 181 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1999) (probationary 
teacher who was acquitted of misdemeanor and felony charges involving alleged sexual assault 
on a student could still be dismissed by the school board for a statement he made at his trial, 
saying that he saw nothing wrong with consensual sex between a teacher and a student), with 
Watson v. Eagle County Sch. Dist., 797 P.2d 768 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (probationary teacher 
who was adviser of school newspaper had free speech right to refuse principal’s instruction to 
publish a retraction of articles in the newspaper presenting the school in a negative light). 
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have upheld dismissals of employees for misconduct involving students, 
regardless of whether the conduct involved sexual contact143 or non-sexual 
conduct reflecting an improper relationship.144  Courts tend to be very 
generous with school boards in discharging employees who have engaged in 
impermissible contact with students, even when that contact occurred in the 
past.145 
Occasionally though, issues involving privacy do surface when school 
board disciplinary actions on teacher relationships with students are 
challenged.  In Holt v. Rapides School Board, a Louisiana court of appeals 
affirmed the trial court’s reversal of a school board’s decision to terminate a 
female teacher for willful neglect of duty for sleeping with another female 
student at a slumber party, and for giving the student birthday gifts.146  The 
court reasoned that the conduct was related to “a family relationship” between 
the teacher and the student.147  Although the court determined that the school 
board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it lacked a rational 
basis,148 the teacher, arguably, could, just as easily, have raised the claim that 
the school board’s decision intruded upon her privacy. 
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,149 a non-education case, the Supreme 
Court reflected in dictum that “choices to enter into and maintain certain 
intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the 
State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual 
freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme.”150  The family 
relationship is one entitled to the highest level of protection from intrusion by 
government because it “involve[s] deep attachments and commitments to the 
 
 143. See, e.g., Morris v. Clarksville-Montgomery County Consol. Bd. of Educ., 867 S.W.2d 
324, 330 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (even though sexual contact with students did not meet 
insubordination grounds for dismissal because there had been no order to cease conduct, the 
dismissal could be supported on the ground of unprofessional conduct). 
 144. See, e.g., Kerin v. Bd. of Educ., Lamar Sch. Dist. No. RE-2, Prowers County, 860 P.2d 
574, 582-83 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (school board could dismiss teacher for fostering parent-child 
type relationship with fourth-grade student and engaging in custody dispute with parent). 
 145. See, e.g., Parker v. Byron Center Pub. Schs., 582 N.W.2d 859  (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) 
(sexual relations with a student sixteen years earlier could support dismissal over teacher’s 
evidentiary and probative claims); Toney v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist., Bd. of 
Educ., 881 P.2d 1112 (Alaska 1994) (teacher could be dismissed for immorality for impregnating 
fifteen-year-old student ten years earlier in another school district); Wright v. Mead Sch. Dist., 
944 P.2d 1 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (sexual contact with students seven to ten years earlier 
supported dismissal of teacher). 
 146. Holt v. Rapides Sch. Bd., 685 So.2d 501, 503-04 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 
 147. See id. at 503. 
 148. Id. at 504. 
 149. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 621 (1984) (Supreme Court upheld state 
gender discrimination claim against Jaycees for refusing to admit women, opining that the 
organization’s expressive views did not prohibit admission of women). 
 150. Id. at 617-18. 
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necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special 
community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal 
aspects of one’s life.”151  The kinds of personal family relationship areas where 
the Supreme Court has provided protection include marriage,152 childbirth,153 
the raising and educating of children,154 and cohabitation with one’s 
relatives.155  Although all of these Supreme Court decisions addressed statutes 
or ordinances that were facially unconstitutional, one could make an argument 
in Holt that application of a school board rule prohibiting willful neglect of 
duty to family relationships could also be subject to scrutiny under privacy 
analysis.  As the cases cited in the Roberts dictum indicate, teachers with 
familial relationships can probably engage in certain kinds of conduct that 
would be considered inappropriate if done outside a family relationship.156 
A school board’s authority to intrude upon a teacher’s private life outside 
the school is limited.  In LaSota v. Town of Topsfield, an elementary school 
teacher’s privacy rights were violated by a school district after she was 
terminated for living with a man whom she married the year after her 
dismissal.157  Prior to her marriage, her husband had been charged and 
convicted of five counts of rape and abuse of his daughter.  These charges were 
 
 151. Id. at 619-20. 
 152. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).  In that case, the Supreme 
Court struck down a Wisconsin statute prohibiting state residents with minor issue not in their 
custody from marrying without court permission because “it would make little sense to recognize 
a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision 
to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society.” Id. 
 153. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (Supreme Court 
invalidated New York statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to persons over 16 years 
of age except from registered pharmacist because “the decision whether or not to beget or bear a 
child is at the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected choices.  That decision holds 
a particularly important place in the history of the right of privacy”). 
 154. See, e.g., Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844-45 (1977) (in upholding a 
New York statute that established procedures for removing children from foster homes, the Court 
nonetheless recognized privacy rights within such homes because “no one would seriously 
dispute that a deeply loving and interdependent relationship between an adult and a child in his or 
her care may exist even in the absence of blood relationship; . . . we cannot dismiss the foster 
family as a mere collection of unrelated individuals”). 
 155. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-05 (1977) (plurality opinion).  In 
striking down city housing ordinance making it a “crime for homeowner to have living with her a 
son and grandson plus second grandson who was cousin of first grandson,” the Court observed 
that “the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the 
family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition . . . [d]ecisions concerning child 
rearing, which Yoder, Meyer, Pierce and other cases have recognized as entitled to constitutional 
protection, long have been shared with grandparents or other relatives who occupy the same 
household indeed — who may take on major responsibility for the rearing of the children.”  Id. 
 156. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984). 
 157. LaSota v. Town of Topsfield, 979 F. Supp. 45, 51 (D. Mass. 1997) (all facts in this 
section are taken from pages 46-48 of the court’s opinion). 
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reversed on appeal and eventually dismissed.  In denying summary judgment 
for the school district, a federal district court in Massachusetts held that 
privacy rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment include “the right to 
associate intimately with a person with whom one contemplates marriage, 
without fear of government interference.”158  As a result, a teacher has “a 
constitutional right to associate intimately without fear that the government 
will use her associations when making decisions concerning her 
employment.”159 
However, family relationships (or what are alleged to be family 
relationships) are not always outside the reach of school board control.  In 
Kerin v. Board of Education, Lamar School District, a Colorado appeals court 
held that a school board had “good and just cause” to terminate a fourth grade 
teacher who, over a period of two years, had established a close relationship 
with a student, had persuaded the mother to give him power of attorney over 
the child, and had initiated a custody action when the mother took the child 
home to Mexico.160 As a result of considerable turmoil in the school 
community when a court order that the teacher be given custody was dissolved, 
the court held that the school board’s legitimate interest “in protecting the 
school community from harm” outweighed the privacy interests of the 
teacher.161  Similarly, a federal district court in Connecticut upheld the 
dismissal of an elementary school social worker for living with a non-custodial 
father of two children to whom she provided social services.162  The court 
remarked that whatever rights of intimate association the social worker might 
have under the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment had to be balanced against those of the school board “in 
promoting the efficiency of public services it performs through its employees” 
and in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible.163  In ruling 
for the school board, the court found persuasive the City Director of Health’s 
reasonable belief that the social worker might have violated the ethics code, 
brought discredit upon municipal service, and hindered other social workers in 
their work.164 
However, even if teacher conduct can be addressed by school boards, it 
might not be subject to criminal prosecution.  In a case with a remarkable 
 
 158. Id. at 50. 
 159. Id.  However, this privacy was considered by the court not to be clearly established at the 
time of the school board’s termination decision, and therefore, the administrators and individual 
school board members were entitled to qualified immunity.  Id. at 48. 
 160. Kerin v. Bd. of Educ., Lamar Sch. Dist. No. RE-2, Prowers County, 860 P.2d 574, 582 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1993). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Kelly v. City of Meridien, 120 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192, 196 (D. Conn. 2000). 
 163. Id. at 197. 
 164. Id. at 197-98. 
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result, State v. Eastwood, a Georgia appeals court affirmed a trial court 
decision voiding a conviction under two counts of sodomy between a high 
school teacher and a student at the ages of fifteen and seventeen.165  At the 
time these acts occurred, Georgia’s anti-sodomy statute set the age of consent 
at fourteen.166  However, the Supreme Court of Georgia, two years earlier, had 
invalidated this statute because it included private, unforced, noncommercial 
acts of sodomy between consenting adults (over age fourteen).167  Because the 
conduct between the student and the teacher was “consensual, unforced, 
private, and noncommercial” and the state legislature had not enacted a statute 
specifically prohibiting the conduct between the student and the teacher, the 
school district was not entitled to a special exception for teachers who engage 
in voluntary acts with students.168  Thus, while the state “may impose 
limitations on the right to privacy by enacting criminal statutes narrowly 
tailored to prohibit such conduct,”169 it had failed to do so in this case.  
Although this case was silent regarding whether the teacher could be dismissed 
for his conduct that did not violate a state criminal statute, the law is fairly well 
established that a school board can dismiss a teacher in an administrative 
proceeding, regardless of the applicability of criminal statutes.170 
By the very nature of the teaching function, teachers become 
knowledgeable of, and occasionally involved in, the personal lives of their 
students.  Invariably, school boards set high standards of professionalism for 
their teachers and will discipline those who cross over the limit of appropriate 
relationships.  Teachers who find themselves inappropriately involved with 
their students will generally find little constitutional or statutory support for 
their conduct. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The privacy rights of teachers in public schools are affected by the 
diminished expectation of privacy that comes with working with minors who 
are required to attend school.  The personal privacy rights of teachers under the 
Liberty Clause are in transition.  Even though issues regarding gender non-
conformity will probably be resolved under state statutes, local ordinances, or 
school board rules protecting such status, as well as the Equal Protection 
Clause, emerging issues involving the Full Faith and Credit Clause remain to 
be resolved. 
 
 165. State v. Eastwood, 535 S.E.2d 246, 247-48 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).  Subsequent to this case, 
the state legislature changed the legal age for consent to sixteen.  Id. at 247 n.1. 
 166. Id. at 247. 
 167. See generally Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998). 
 168. Eastwood, 535 S.E.2d at 247-48. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See, e.g., Padilla v. South Harrison R-H Sch. Dist., 181 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1999); Hudson 
v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 572 N.W.2d 379 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997). 
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Although the rights of teachers regarding search and seizure are not well 
defined, courts have taken their lead from the Supreme Court’s search and 
seizure cases involving students and have given school boards considerable 
latitude in controlling teacher behavior in the classroom.  Teachers have 
considerable control over what occurs in the classroom, but their actions are 
not outside the authority of school boards.  Despite a number of constitutional 
theories that teachers can raise to defend their conduct within classrooms, that 
conduct is generally subject to school board discipline, especially when the 
conduct relates to course content and methodologies. 
Teacher conduct outside the school has greater protection for the teacher, 
but if that conduct involves students, school boards have legitimate interests in 
protecting students.  Courts are able to draw fine lines and distinguish between 
conduct that directly involves students with conduct that affects students only 
indirectly.  When conduct involves non-student adults, school boards have a 
challenging task to connect associations outside the school to conduct within 
the school. 
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